Midway ref in title; pretty nice movie, should be available cheap. Anyway. On to Hitchens and indeed to Vox Day. The claim: those two bombs intended for Germany but held over for Japan were redundant for Japan as well.
Japan had extended an armistice offer. It was pretty-well known in Japan that they'd lost the war. The next question remained how they'd lose it. In Japan, some preferred to lose "honourably". Vox Day as usual picks one article and pretends that covers his whole argument. Those of us who aren't in his cult - and he is running a cult - might dredge up the memory that the US thought that the bombs would be necessary on account the US was, like, reading Japan's mail. That includes diplomatic communication, not just military-commands. I don't see where Japan's feelers for an armistice appear in that mail.
Okay, maybe Japan had dug in its heels exactly because the US (which, again, was winning) rejected its most-generous initial offer. They'd dug those heels in pretty hard as the Kyoujou Incident illustrates. Again: the US was reading Japan's mail. The US figured that demonstrations were needed. The chemical firebombs presented an impressive demonstration but they clearly hadn't worked.
Ultimately, I think we need to consider what "surrender" can mean. Take 1918. 11 November was an armistice, not a surrender. In theory Germany's government (whatever it was - we'll get to this) could have ramped up the war again. In the 1950s the Korean War will "end" in an armistice and, we all know the Kims. If that's what 1945 Japan was asking for, then who-knows. Japan keeps its Emperor, and its army; nobody in its armed-forces gets called for their crimes (731 anyone?); all the other Asians excepting Taiwan and maybe some Koreans are furious at the Allies and ponder an antiWestern alliance.
Then there's various shades of conditional-surrender. A fairly heavy shade of surrender is the deal which MacArthur accepted. Japan keeps its Emperor but must accept a Constitution as brings its army under heel, which army is now a "Defence Force" (yeah yeah the US claims its War Department is a "Defense" Department, but the Japs don't fib like Yanks do).
Unconditional surrender is what the Germans had to do - twice. First time, their government had collapsed between armistice and treaty, as did the governments of any potential allies (Hungary, Austria, the Ottomans) such that the emissaries could mount no arguments at Versailles excepting moral arguments (good luck with those against Clemenceau) and the spectre of Communism (more credible). The second time: the German and Axis armies were pretty-well extirpated once Schiklgruber and Goebbels checked out. Forcing unconditionality upon Japan meant facing a postKyoujou fanatical guerrilla in Japan's mountains. Oh, and Stalin in all Korea, probably Hokkaido next. But now we're just repeating the midwit wisdom.
Remember: the midwit wisdom is the midwit wisdom because, within the fringes, it's the correct wisdom. When the fringes turn out correct, they get into the history books and they become the midwits. But that's rare when it happens.